In an exchange economy with liquidity constraints, we show that state prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank. Our model is derived along the lines of Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) . The main result is that, with Von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions and relative risk-aversion greater than one, the price of AD securities are inversely related to liquidity. A closed-form solution is obtained for CRRA utility functions, even when including aggregate uncertainty and different subjective probabilities for the two agents. The upshot of our argument is that agents' expectations computed using risk-neutral probabilities give more weight to the states with higher interest rates. Hence, an upward solping yield curve can be supported in equilibrium, even though short-term interest rates are fairly stable, and even in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. The risk-premium in the term structure is therefore a pure liquidity risk premium.
Introduction
According to the expectations hypothesis, a building block of the efficient market hypothesis, forward interest rates should reflect expectations of future spot rates. However, forward rates have on average been higher than realised spot interest rates. There are two possible explanations for this longstanding empirical puzzle. Is the efficient market hypothesis failing in the bond market or are the risk-neutral probabilities weighted more heavily whenever the spot interest rates are relatively higher? The early literature emphasised the importance of liquidity on the term structure of interest rates. Hicks (1946) suggested that risk-averse investors would prefer to hold short rather than long-term bonds because of the price risk they bear in the intermediate dates. Thus, they would request a liquidity premium for holding longer term debt that, in turn, would introduce an upward slope to the yield curve. The same argument was put forward by Lutz (1940) who claimed that longer term securities are relatively less liquid than short-term ones. Finally, Modigliani and Sutch (1966) proposed the preferred habitat hypothesis, arguing that agents prefer to trade bonds to match their asset and liability maturities. Hence, the markets for long-term and short-term bonds would be segmented, and consequently the link between long and short-term interest rates would break down.
The modern literature, following Lucas (1978) has focused on the importance of aggregate risk. The Lucas model has a representative agent, general equilibrium, form without money where preferences determine asset prices.
In particular, because of the risk-aversion of the representative agent, forward rates are higher than expected spot rates. As Breeden (1979) has shown, the risk-premium is proportional to the correlation between marginal utilities and asset payoffs. In other worlds, risk-neutral probabilities vary proportionally with expected marginal utilities (Breeden and Litzenberger, 1978) .
Various applications of this model have been produced, modeling the term structure of interest rates Ross, 1985a and 1985b) , the Consumption CAPM and an attempt to explain the equity-premium puzzle using the Breeden formula (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) .
In the present paper, we argue that aggregate consumption risk is not the only source of risk-premia in asset prices. An additional risk-premium exists because of the effect of financing costs. Financing costs generate a "wedge" between selling and buying prices and therefore affect marginal utilities and consequently equilibrium prices. Unlike what happens in a representative agent model, this premium exists even in absence of aggregate uncertainty (i.e., when endowments and aggregate consumption are constant), whenever the volume of trade is positive.
To generate financing costs, we set out a monetary general equilibrium model, with cash-in-advance constraints built along the lines of Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992 , 2003 , 2006 , Geanakoplos and Tsomocos (2002) , Goodhart et al. (2006) and Tsomocos (2003 Tsomocos ( , 2007 . We need a general equilibrium model because we want to endogenise all demands for money in order to construct the risk-neutral probabilities and the yield curve. Given the existence of outside money, which produces positive interest rates, these models generate demand for liquidity and locally unique positive nominal interest rates.
We price nominal Arrow-Debreu securities (AD securities). The assumption of complete markets is needed here because we want to solve for all AD securities' prices. If the prices of AD securities were constant through all states of nature, then the historical average of spot interest rates that would proxy rational expectations without a risk-premium E t [r t,t+s ] would be equal to the expected interest rate Eπ[r t,t+s ] using risk-neutral probabilitiesπ. However, we will show that this is not the case in our model, even when there is no real uncertainty.
The main result of the paper is that, provided that agents' relative risk aversion is greater than one, states with higher interest rates (lower liquidity supplied by the Central Bank) have higher state prices. The model goes beyond representative agent models in several ways. First, we model trade activity so that it is endogenous -in fact, trade activity is determined by liquidity. Recall that representative agent models can be thought of as "sell-all' models thereby determining trade a priori. These models have been extended, adding money in a cash-in-advance framework (Lucas and Stokey, 1983 and 1987) , but money plays a role only through income and expectations, not through trade. Second, because in our model trade is constrained by liquidity, security prices -and in particular bond prices -are determined by liquidity as well. Thus, we are able to calculate explicitly the "liquidity premium". Finally, even when aggregate endowment and consumption are constant across all states, equilibrium prices manifest a risk-premium. However, the necessary conditions for its existence are, in that case, a positive volume of trade and financing costs.
The lesson of the model is that uncertainty in aggregate production, or in aggregate consumption, is only one part of uncertainty in agents' marginal utilities. Bansal and Coleman II (1996) produce a representative agent general equilibrium model with transaction costs that capture partly their effect on bond prices. However, in their model, trade is forced, since the representative agent sells all of his endowment and subsequently buys it back, and, in addition, the transaction technology is exogenously specified. In particular, transaction services are generated only from bond holdings and not from asset holdings. Therefore, any model of risk-premium that attempts to proxy welfare solely by production or consumption will underestimate risk-premium. This is especially important for the term structure risk premium since the spot interest rate has both an effect on the asset price and on transaction costs. In that case, the correlation between the marginal utilities and the asset price is likely to be high. Consequently, the error will be an under-estimation of the risk-premium.
Many authors (e.g. Kirman, 1992) have argued that representative agent models are inadequate for welfare analysis ; however, their pricing results are quite robust. According to representative agent models, for any price vector, there exists a representative agent utility that justifies this price vector. But what happens if policy changes the price vector? There is nothing that guarantees that the same representative agent's utility function is still valid, particularly when the volume of trade is affected by the new price vector (i.e., the classical dichotomy does not hold). The critique hence relies on welfare implications and the impossibility of conducting comparative statics.
Thus, the importance of heterogeneity is sometimes underlined. Fan (2006) , for instance, models the time-varying risk premium of the term structure using heterogeneous beliefs. Our paper can be understood as an example of the effects of financing costs on the volume of trade and in turn on prices and allocations. For a given riskless endowment vector, no representative agent model specification would replicate an upward sloping term-structure in our paper. The two-agent general equilibrium model with cash-in-advance constraint that we construct is, on the contrary, able to do so because transaction costs affect marginal utilities, even though they do not affect aggregate consumption.
We model an exchange economy with cash-in-advance constraints where a larger money supply has the effect of only lowering transaction costs and has no other effect on production or endowments. More money supply allows for more efficient trade since transaction costs are lower. The model is derived first with one commodity only, and then extended to multiple commodities, but the intuition is not affected by this extension. In any case, it is intertemporal trade that matters since this is what drive asset prices. The Friedman rule of the optimum quantity of money obtains when the money supply is infinite and, therefore, nominal interest rates are equal to zero. These cashin-advance models have several drawbacks; in particular the money supply is exogenously given, and the positive value of the interest rate depends on the existence of "outside money" (i.e. agents' monetary endowments free and clear of any liability), a somewhat controversial assumption. However, the advantage of the cash-in-advance constraint model in our case is that it allows us to incorporate markets for money where money has positive value, even in a finite-horizon model. More fundamentally, the cash-in-advance constraint allows money to be non-neutral, although money does not enter agents' utility function.
The Model
The model is an exchange economy with complete markets and money. Trade takes place between two agents who want to trade across periods (for consumption smoothing purposes) and across states (because of risk-aversion).
Because cash is needed before commodity transactions, and because receipts of sales cannot be used immediately to buy commodities, agents require cash as a derived demand due to their transaction needs. Money is supplied exogenously by the Central Bank who can diminish transaction costs by increasing money supply. With lower transaction costs, more trade (i.e. more activity in this exchange economy) takes places and agents are closer to the standard General Equilibrium Pareto optimum.
Structure of the Model
The model is built around two types of infinitely-lived representative agents, α and β. At time t, agents α and β maximise
For any time period s, the set of possible states of nature is F s . Subjective probabilities of agent h are π h t,k h ∈ {α, β}. Without loss of generality, we set δ = 1.
1
Agents are endowed with the unique consumption good, e h t,k k ∈ F t , h ∈ {α, β} and with an exogenous amount of fiat outside money m h t , h ∈ {α, β}, the meaning of which will be discussed later. We assume outside money endowments are non-random, without affecting the results of the model. Consumption in state of nature k is defined as c
where q h t,k is the amount of good sold by agent h, b h t,k is the value of good bought, and p t,k is the price of the consumption good.
Since there is only one homogeneous good and there are transaction costs, agents never buy and sell at the same time. Because the transaction cost applies only to the buyer (a result that will be explained later) it is important to know who is buying and selling at each period and each state. We make here a simplifying assumption that makes the model easier to understand.
The assumption is that, for any time period indexed by an even number (s = 2z), agent β holds positive endowments of the commodity in all the 1 Subjective probabilities can be adjusted to take into account the discount rate.
states of nature, while agent α is not endowed with any good in all state of nature. The situation is reversed between agent α and agent β for any time period s = 2z + 1.
This assumption implies that, at any given time, agent α is either buying or selling, independently of the state of nature, although the volume of trade will be state-contingent. The same applies to β as well (who of course will be selling when α is buying). Furthermore, this implies that we can focus only on consecutive time periods where the roles of agent α and β are changing.
If α is buying in period s, she will be selling in period s + 1, unless she wants to roll over the inter-temporal bonds. If she does so, when she rolls-over the AD securities, the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding, and standard pricing formulas would apply.
Financial markets are dynamically complete, i.e. the number of securities is equal to the maximum number of states succeeding any node in the the state space. Figure 1 summarises the endowments and financial markets available. Each period is divided into sub-periods during which the commodity and money markets meet, as pictured in figure 2 . This is the core of the cashin-advance model. In a nutshell, agents cannot use the receipts of their expected sales to repay their loans, because of illiquidity in the goods mar-ket (represented by the fact that these same receipts arrive late at the end of the period). Hence, in the future, they will need to borrow in the short-term money market (intra-period market) to repay their debt. As they take this into account in their inter-temporal decisions, the state prices will be a function of their expected financing costs. We will explain below exactly what each agent does in the different sub-periods. The Central Bank provides • the short-run money market in period s and state k, with money supply M s,k , interest rate r s,k and bond price η s,k = 1 1 + r s,k
• ∀i ∈ F s+1 the state-i money market, with money supply M s+1,i , interest rate r s+1,i and bond price η s+1,i = 1 1 + r s+1,i
The money supplies in the different states of nature are exogenous. Although the interest rate in each of these money markets will be deduced from demand and supply, the form of the model ensures in fact that the interest rates are just inversely proportional to the Central Bank money supply. In addition to these money markets, the two agents can trade Arrow-Debreu securities defined at time s state k to cover all states of nature in the next period:
(AD s,k,i ) i∈F s+1 . The AD securities give 1 in state i and 0 in all other states j = i. All AD securities are in zero net supply. Financial markets are dynamically complete with this structure. We will compute the AD security prices and show how they are related to interest rates. The first step is however to link interest rates and the real economy using a cash-in-advance model.
An Aside on Cash-in-Advance Models, Money and Default
Cash-in-advance models 2 aim to capture the importance of liquidity for transactions. A common criticism of the cash-in-advance models is that the constraints used are ad hoc and do not adequately capture liquidity or collateral requirements. General specifications of cash-in-advance constraints can, however, partly answer this critique. If x 1 and x 2 are consumption levels in commodities 1 and 2, p 1 and p 2 are commodity prices, a general form of the cash-in-advance budget constraint is
where e 1 and e 2 are commodity endowments and λ 1 and λ 2 liquidity parameters. For instance, if good 1 is the illiquid consumption good, and cannot serve for transaction, λ 1 = 0. If good 2 is fiat money (i.e. a liquid commodity that cannot be consumed) then λ 2 = 1 and x 2 = 0. This is the specification that we will use in this paper. The main intuition of the generalised form of the cash-in-advance constraint is that the different commodities of the economy are not equally liquid, i.e. not all receipts from sales can be contemporaneously used for other purchases. As long as there exist some liquidity parameters for the commodity endowment which are less than 1 (otherwise, the budget constraints collapse to the standard Arrow-Debreu constraints), money (or liquidity or credit) demand is positive in order to bridge the gap between expenditures and receipts.
3 With λ 1 = 0 and λ 2 = 1, exposition is made easier, and we will, following the modern treatment of cash-in-advance models, use this version in the remainder of the paper.
To ensure a positive nominal interest rate, a sufficient requirement is that agents hold some exogenous endowment of money (called outside money).
We will show later that, when M is the supply of money by the Central Bank, if e 2 = m > 0, the nominal interest is r = m M . Although an exogenous endowment of money can be justified in a one-period model 4 , this assumption is harder to explain in a multi-period setting. Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006) , following Gurley and Shaw (1960) 's initial statement of the difference between inside and outside money, argue that outside money is indeed a reality : for instance, when money is printed by the government to purchase real assets, commodities, or pay for labour, it gives money to the private sector clear of any liability, and independently from Central Bank lending.
In the US, this is made impossible because the Treasury cannot print money, but needs instead to borrow from the Federal Reserve, with the possibility then to roll over to perpetuity or even simply to default. One can also think of outside money as a compact simplification for a more general nominal friction that pins down the price of money. Default on the money market plays, for instance, the same role as outside money to ensure the existence of a positive interest rate (Espinoza et al., 2007) . Put differently, one can redefine assets as a vector of payoffs with exogenous default rates d i in the intra-period loan market and find that the interest rate is
idea is extended in Shubik and Tsomocos (1992) 4 Outside money may be inherited from previous periods and free from any debt requirement outstanding.
5 The only exception is when interest rates are equal to zero. Then changing prices and money supply is tantamount to changing units of account while maintaining zero interest rates 6 see Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006) and Tsomocos (2007) for a formal proof
This class of models generates inefficient allocation because transaction costs create a wedge between selling and buying prices. Hence the optimal quantity of money that reestablishes efficiency is infinite, so as to produce zero interest rates 7 . We emphasize that these results also require positive net trades that depend on monetary aggregates. Therefore, the only exception is the representative agent model which is dichotomous and in which monetary aggregates do not affect trade.
Budget Set for Agent α
We assume that at period s and state k, agent α is endowed with goods In period s + 1 state i, agent α's issues of AD security reach maturity and agent α has to give q α AD s,i to agent β who -as we will see later -had bought the AD securities. She may also want to invest again for the next period, by buying AD securities
. Since α cannot yet use the receipts of goods sold in state i because the goods market meets after financial 7 For this to be true, it is necessary for inflation to be costless. . We do not make explicit in these equations that agent α can carry money over from period s to period s + 1 because she will in fact never choose to do so, as all constraints are binding -something we will see later. Agent α's maximisation programme is therefore (in brackets are the Lagrangian multipliers):
Budget Set for Agent β
We assume that agent β is endowed with goods at times s indexed by even numbers e In period s state k , she sells q β k but she will receive the cash only at the end of the period. She wants to buy AD securities b
to finance consumption-smoothing in the future, and she also needs to pay q β AD k for the AD-security she had sold in period s − 1. For this to be possible, she borrows η k µ β k on the period-s state-k short-term money market at cost r s,k . She then repays the loan with her receipts p k q β k . We do not make explicit the possibility for agent β to carry money over since she will never do so, since we will show that all constraints are binding. As a result, all the receipts from the sales of goods in period s state k are invested in AD securities, and this means that agent β borrows short-term as much as she will be able to repay.
In period s + 1 state i, she receives the state-contingent revenue from the AD i -security b β AD i θ i and she uses this to buy the consumption good (in value b β i ). She can also borrow using the AD securities that will be repaid in period s + 2.
Agent β maximises inter-temporal utility as defined in equation (1). In addition to her financial choices (µ 
Financial General Equilibrium
We say that p k , q
is a Financial General Equilibrium 8 if and only if:
The existence of a Financial General Equilibrium is guaranteed since the Gains-fromTrade Hypothesis Geanakoplos, 1992 and 2003) is automatically satisfied because of our assumed endowment configuration
(iv) Money and AD security markets clear, i.e.
Importantly, we restrict our study only to interior equilibria where all financial markets are working and, as a result (see below) no money is carried over.
Interest Rates and the Quantity Theory of Money
In our discussion on the implications of cash-in-advance models, we explained that, given the existence of outside money (or equivalently exogenous default), interest rates are positive and nominal determinacy occurs. This section confirms these assertions in our 2-agent model with complete markets. The following proposition shows that short-term interest rates are determined in a way that is exogenous to real demand functions.
Proposition 1: Term Structure
Proof For a period s = 2z where β is borrowing in the short-term money market,
and the first result follows. The proof is similar for periods s = 2z + 1 where agent α is borrowing on the short-term money market .
Since we are studying interior equilibria, all constraints are binding. Using good, money, and AD securities' market clearing conditions, we deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Quantity theory of money
Proof
We know, for s = 2z
and, from the market-clearing conditions
The result then follows since η s,k µ β s,k = M s,k . The same proof applies for s = 2z + 1 . Agent α is the only agent who needs cash in period s, state k, and she needs it only for b s,k . Therefore, she will use all available cash (her cash and the cash supplied by agent β, m 
Asset Prices and Money
This section derives the first order conditions and solves for the equilibrium state prices.
Agent α First Order Conditions
Denote L the Lagrangian formed from the maximisation problem. The first order conditions are, ∀s = 2z,
First, note that for an interior equilibrium, the marginal utility of consuming b 0 -which is never null with a proper utility function -is equal to ϕ ,i are non-null. The consequence is that no money is carried over. The same demonstration will apply for agent β.
Agent β First Order Conditions
Denote L the Lagrangian formed from the maximisation problem. The first order conditions are:
General Theorems
The theorems below are proved for times s = 2z + 1 where agent α is selling goods, but since the model is symmetric, the proof is identical for times s = 2z where agent β is selling. q α i should therefore be understood more generally as the volume of trade.
Theorem 1: Non-neutrality of money
In an interior equilibrium, in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, and if the two agents have the same subjective probabilities, states with higher interest rates exhibit lower trade (i.e. r i > r j =⇒ q
Proof From the first-order conditions of agent α, ∀i
From the first order conditions of agent β, ∀i
Dividing equation 5 by equation 6, we find, ∀i, j
or equivalently, using the market-clearing conditions
Assuming ∀i e 
We can show that the function
is increasing in q α i for all utility functions such that u α > 0 ; u α < 0 and
In an interior equilibrium, in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, if the two agents have the same subjective probabilities, and if agent β's relative risk-aversion is greater or equal to 1, states with higher interest rates see their state prices biased upwards.
Theorem 2: Endogenous State Prices
Assume ∀s = 2z, ∀x ∈ F s+1 , π
and
Proof
Using equation 6 and the market clearing conditions
This can also be rewritten in terms of ratio of state price
Using the quantity theory of money
When liquidity is higher in state i, from theorem 1, activity q α i is higher. If relative risk aversion is greater than 1, u β (q)q is decreasing 9 and therefore
is also lower. This shows that θ i is lower when r i is lower. Since r i is an inverse function of M i we deduce the final result
We can equivalently work with risk-neutral probabilitieŝ
and show the same result .
This is the main result of our model. It first shows that risk-neutral probabilities are endogenous in a cash-in-advance general equilibrium model in contrast with arbitrage models whereby prices follow various stochastic processes and thus risk-neutral probabilities are not demand and supply driven.
This result even holds without aggregate uncertainty, and is therefore not a simple version of the Breeden and Lucas results. Furthermore, the fact that states with higher interest rates are given higher weights yields important results for the yield curve and resolves the paradox we stated in the introduction without violating the rational expectation hypothesis.
Extensions
The previous theorems hold for no-aggregate uncertainty and when the subjective probability distribution of the borrower and the lender are equal.
Continuity arguments ensure that this general results hold locally, i.e. if the subjective probabilities or the endowments differ by a infinitesimal quantity (Proposition 3). We can also carry the results with non-infinitesimal differences assuming that preferences are given by CRRA utility functions with same risk-aversion for both agents (Proposition 4).
Proposition 3 : Local Properties
Let endowments or subjective probabilities of state i and j differ by an infinitesimal quantity. . Therefore, can represent any difference between α's and β's subjective probabilities, without loss of generality.
We show here the dependence of q α i and q α j on the subjective probabilities of states i and j (keeping in mind that other variables matter as well) : 
we have in the limit that f (q
, and since f is continuous and increasing q α i ( ) < q α j ( ) when → 0. The proof of the second part then follows the proof of theorem 2, in particular equation 9.
Proposition 4: Closed-form solution
If agents α and β preferences are given by a CRRA utility function with same constant risk-aversion coefficient ρ, then ∀i, j ∈ F s+1
Proof
The first order conditions of agents α and β and the market clearing condi-
Dividing equation 13 by equation 14 yields
Dividing equation 15 applied to state of nature i by the same equation 15 applied to state of nature j, we show the first result. The second result comes from the application of equation 11 to equation 9.
Proposition 3 allows us to summarize the core of the model in only two equations, although at the expense of forcing risk-aversion to be similar for the two agents. The first result tells us that the proportion of endowments traded is greater the lower the interest rate. This result is therefore a generalisation of Theorem 1 when there is aggregate uncertainty. However, in this general setting with different subjective probabilities, the relative importance of state i for agent α and β also matters : if β (who is buying the AD securities) gives more importance (relatively to α) to state i, this will decrease trade.
The second equation summarises the state price argument. The first two terms are characteristic of any asset pricing equation to be imbedded in a general equilibrium model: if subjective probabilities (of the asset's buyer) are higher for state i, this will increase the state price. Furthermore, if aggregate endowment is lower in state i, this will also increase the state price because lower aggregate endowment implies lower consumption and therefore higher marginal utility. The last two terms are however special to our model. The ratio of money supplies matters because the state prices are prices of assets that payoff in nominal terms. Because a higher money supply implies a higher price level, the value of the asset today is a decreasing function of next period's price level. Finally, the last term is the key general equilibrium effect: a higher spot interest rate r i tends to lower trade activity and therefore lowers consumption of the agent who buys in the future (i.e. agent β). But agent β is also the one that is buying the AD securities, and since she is willing to pay a higher price for assets that payoff in the states of nature when her consumption is low, she is therefore ready to pay more for AD-securities that pay off in states of nature with higher interest rates.
Hence, states with higher interest rates have also higher state prices.
Multiple Commodities
An extension with multiple goods for additively separable utility functions is also possible. The main result of the paper obtains, assuming that there exists one good that is always bought (either by agent α or β) independently of the state of nature, and for which the price level decreases when money supply decreases.
Maximisation problem
Let l ∈ L = {1, . . . , L} be the index of goods available in any state or period, and u l,h utility of agent h in good l. We note L h i + the set of goods in state i for which agent h will sell goods, while L h i − is the set of goods for which agent h will buy goods. With positive transaction costs, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006) show that there is no wash sales, i.e. L We focus on a 2-period model here, for simplification. Each trade and endowment variable is indexed by the state of nature and by the commodity to which it refers. Trade in assets, represented by q h AD i may be positive or negative here. The maximisation problem of agent h ∈ {α, β} is:
Value of Money and Quantity Theory of Money
The following propositions hold with many commodities (the proofs are identical to the one for propositions 1 and 2).
Proposition 5:
Proposition 6:
Identical results are shown for the different states of nature i.
First Order Conditions
For any state i (or in period 0, i = 0), let the index i, 1 denote a good bought by agent α, and the index i, L a good bought by agent β. Then, the first order conditions are, for agent α.
The First Order Conditions are the same for agent β except that a good i, 1 becomes a good i, L and vice-versa. Using the First-Order Conditions, for a good in time 0 that is bought by α:
Trade
Similarly, for a good in time 0 that is sold by α:
Hence, for a good L that is sold by α in states i and j,
This same good L is therefore bought by β in both states i and j and therefore:
Dividing equation (16) by equation (17),
From the market-clearing conditions, and assuming e i = e j ,
Hence (this replicates the proof for theorem 1),
State Prices
Assume furthermore that the direction of trade of all goods is independent of the state of nature. In that case, our state price theorem applies as before.
Theorem 2'
Assume that ∀h ∈ {α, β}, ∀i
Assume furthermore that RRA ≥ 1, that there is no aggregate uncertainty, and that subjective probabilities are homogeneous. Then, r i > r j =⇒ θ i /π i > θ j /π j .
Proof:
We use β's First Order Conditions for a good L always bought by β (independently of the state of nature), and, from the market-clearing condition
Rearranging:
Assume r i > r j , i.e. M i < M j . From the quantity theory of money
Therefore, there must be one good g for which p i,g q h i,g ≤ p j,g q h j,g . Now, if this good is traded in only one direction, independently of the state of nature (and this will always occur if all goods are always traded in only one direction, independently of the state of nature), we know that
Intuition
Our result is not simply a version of the risk-premium found in endowment general equilibriums models with heterogeneous agents or in a representative agent model (Lucas, 1978; Breeden, 1979 ; Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985) .
Indeed, even when the endowment risk-premium has been removed as in 
The upshot of our argument is that uncertainty in aggregate production or in aggregate consumption is only one part of uncertainty in agents' marginal utilities. Transaction costs also generate variability of marginal utilities (and therefore of asset demands) in the future. Therefore, any model of riskpremium that attempts to proxy welfare by production or consumption will underestimate the risk-premium. This is especially important for the termstructure risk premium since the spot interest rate has an effect both on the asset price and on the transaction cost. Hence, the correlation between the marginal utilities and the asset price is likely to be high. The risk-premium would, in that case, be erroneously underestimated.
Application : The Term Structure of Interest Rates
The model can be applied to show the existence of a 'liquidity-premium'. This is the purpose of Espinoza, Goodhart and Tsomocos (2007) , an application with closed-form solution of the model presented here, using a logarithmic utility function and exogenous default. Here we do not model default, and keep instead the more common cash-in-advance model with outside money, following Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) . Thanks to the theorems and propositions stated above, our results are also more general here since they do not depend on a particular form of the utility function.
One can think of three effects of liquidity on bond prices. One liquidity premium would come from the costs incurred in a market where volumes and trade in an asset are small so that transaction costs are larger. A second cost is the one described by Hicks (1946) :
"the imperfect 'moneyness' of those bills which are not money is due to their lack of general acceptability which causes the trouble of investing in them, and causes them to stand at a discount"
The third effect, the liquidity premium we have here, comes from the the additional cost incurred by investors (and priced in the term structure) that an uncertain money supply will generate when liquidity is restricted (i.e. when the constraint binds, which is the assumption behind a cash-in-advance constraint model). Note that the level of money supply does not really matter: in the long run, if prices adjust to the money supply, constraints on liquidity do not have real effects -although this is not captured in our cash-in-advance constraint where the optimal supply of money would be infinite 10 . However, what still has effects is the variance (or risk) of liquidity.
This is exactly what is captured in this model, where we show that larger liquidity risks generate higher long-term interest rates. Stricto sensu, our model is therefore a model of the "liquidity-risk premium". This liquidity risk-premium is deduced immediately from the previous section, since riskneutral probabilities are high when the interest rates are high. Formally, let b be a bond that would be bought in period t at the time when the AD market meets and would mature at period t + 1 when the intra-period bond of second period matures. A no-arbitrage arguments ensure that its price is
By approximating, and writingη = 1 1 +r we find r b ≈r + i∈Ftπ i (r i )r i .
It is clear here how the long-term interest rate depends on a convex function of r i sinceπ i is already an increasing function of r i . The first consequence is that the forward interest rate Eπ[r f ] = π i (r i )r i is above the expected future spot rate E 0 [r f ] = π i r i . Hence, the model is able to replicate the puzzling historical fact that the forward term premium, i.e. the difference 10 We acknowledge that a deterministic decrease in money supply may also have a shortterm liquidity cost if there is some inertia Figure 3 : Long-term bond between the forward rate and the corresponding expected future spot rate, is positive (Shiller, 1990) . This is what we call a "liquidity-risk premium", since it is generated here from uncertainty in the supply of liquidity from the Central Bank, even in the absence of aggregate real uncertainty. The second implication of this result is that a larger variance in expected spot rates will generate a higher "liquidity-risk premium" and a higher long-term interest rate. Consequently, stability of monetary policy matters in determining the equilibrium value of long-term interest rates.
Concluding Remarks
In a state with low liquidity, trade has to be low, and, in order to induce consumers to trade at a low level, the opportunity cost of transferring money to this state must be high. This financing cost is equal to the state price.
Therefore, state prices and risk-neutral probabilities are higher in states with higher interest rates. It is important to stress that the result is due to the interaction of the money market (the quantity theory of money) with the exchange economy (the Euler equations) and therefore cannot be found in a pure financial model. Ultimately, it is the risk of variations in the supply of money that matters to determine the risk in trade values. Liquidity shocks are crucial to understanding the upward sloping term structure because two phenomena push in the same direction: first, the futures spot interest rates are affected ; second the risk-neutral probabilities are modified. The interac-tion of these two effects pushes long-term rates above the historical average of future spot rates, even with nonexistent aggregate real risk. And the more uncertainty in the future spot rates, the higher the long-term rates. Stability of monetary policy is, therefore, required to maintain flat yield curves.
This connects to another subject of discussion in the current yield curve literature, the fact that the term structure has been flatter in recent years.
This movement could be explained by traditional parameters, i.e. a lower volatility of expected short-term interest rates (thanks to improved Central Bank policy and credibility) or a lower volatility of marginal utilities (thanks to attenuation of business cycles). But other interpretations relating to the development of financial markets also seem warranted. Extensions of our model that would include incomplete markets and a finer definition of liquidity could probably address this issue.
